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COMMERCIAL LAW 
FREDERICK M. HART 
COMMERCIAL law is not particularly vulnerable to explosions. Most cases are routine, or, at best, require the extension of settled 
doctrines to novel situations created by the ingenuity of aggressive 
businessmen struggling to maintain their existence in face of fierce 
competition. Codification has also played its part in stabilizing the 
law in this area. 
Occasionally, however, litigants cry for the reexamination of a 
doctrine, claiming that it has outlived its usefulness and no longer 
mirrors reality. This is first seen in lower court cases. If the inferior 
courts are convinced that the cause is worthy, eventually one or more 
of the cases will reach the Court of Appeals. 
The fuse to the bomb has been lit in New York for several years. 
It has now burned to its end. The issue: should privity of contract 
remain a requirement in warranty actions? The Court of Appeals' 
answer: still unknown. 
I 
SALES 
Following the pattern of previous years, a sizeable proportion 
of the reported sales cases involved warranties. Although the most 
dramatic development in 1959 was the striking reversal of the recent 
trend discarding the privity requirement, several other interesting 
questions were also presented which indicate that privity of contract 
is not the only unsettled problem in warranty actions. Last to be dis-
cussed are the nonliability cases, the most important of which is one 
involving the Statute of Frauds. 
Vendor's Liability-Warranties-Privity.-Last year's Survcy1 
discussed at some length lower court decisions vehemently denouncing 
the "archaic notion that privity [ of contract] is an essential to recovery 
in a breach of warranty action."2 One of these, Greenberg v. Lorenz,8 
Frederick M. Hart is Professor of Law at Albany Law School, Union University, 
and a Member of the District of Columbia and New York Bars. 
1 1958 Survey of N.Y. Law, 33 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1146, 1153. For additional comments 
on the privity question during the past year, see Condon, Progress of Products Linblllty 
Law, 31 N.Y.S.B. Bull. 119 (1959); 23 Albany L. Rev. 451 (1959); 8 Buffalo L. Rev. 
290 (1959); 44 Cornell L.Q. 608 (1959); and 9 Syracuse L. Rev. 326 (1958). 
2 Parish v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 13 Misc. 2d 33, 64, 177 N.Y.S.2d 7, 38 
(N.Y.C. Munic. Ct. 1958). 
3 14 Misc. 2d 279, 178 N.Y.S.2d 404 (N.Y. City Ct. 1957), modified, 12 Misc. 2d 
883, 178 N.Y.S.2d 407 (Sup. Ct., App. T., 1st Dep't 1958), rev'd, 7 App. Div. 2d 9681 
183 N.Y.S.2d 46 (1st Dep't 1959). The following cases also denied recovery on warranty 
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had reached the appellate term in the first department where a divided 
court affirmed a judgment in favor of an infant-plaintiff injured while 
eating food purchased by her parent. During the past year this decision 
was reversed by the appellate division with two of five judges dissent-
ing.4 The court wrote only a per curiam opinion citing Clzysky 'ii. 
Drake5 and Salzano v. First Nat'l Stores, Inc.,° with neither of the 
dissenting judges stating reasons for his dissent. 
The second department also followed the Clz.ysky rule in Papp 'V. 
Jackson Mfg. Co.1 Here a retailer, who was himself being sued 
for injuries sustained from an allegedly defective concrete cart 
which he sold to the plaintiff, cross-complained in warranty against 
the manufacturer. The court, in a memorandum decision, affirmed a 
dismissal of the cross-complaint on the ground that, since the defendant 
had purchased the cart not from the manufacturer but from a third 
party, he was not in privity. The Court of Appeals has granted a 
motion for leave to appeal and for a stay in this action.8 
The third department had two opportunities to explore the privity 
question and in both cases it followed the maxim "no privity, no 
warranty." In Burke v. Associated Coca-Cola Bottling Plants, Inc.,0 
the plaintiff had purchased a bottled beverage from a vending machine 
and brought an action in warranty against the bottler for alleged 
injuries. The beverage was owned and offered for sale in the machine 
by third parties who had previously purchased it from the defendant-
bottler. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant, because of advertis-
ing and the use of his name on the machine, was the "ostensible" 
seller and hence in privity with consumers. The court reversed a 
judgment in favor of the plaintiff holding that "the general invitation 
to the public to buy the beverage, and hence the contractual relation-
ship arising from such an invitation . . . is not with the defendant, 
but with the actual vendors of the beverage.mo 
The plaintiff in Krom v. S!tarp & Doltme, bzc.,11 the other third 
department case, sued the processor of blood plasma for damages 
counts because of a lack of privity: Peragine v. Esposito, 17 Misc. 2d 621, 184 N.Y.S.2d 
25 (Sup. Ct., App. T., 1st Dep't 1959); Courter v. Dilbert Bros., 186 N.Y.Sid 334 (Sup. 
Ct., App. T., 2d Dep't 1958); and Shoopak v. United States Rubber Co., 17 Misc. 2d 
201, 183 N.Y.S.2d 112 (Sup. Ct., Westcb. Co. 1959). 
4 Greenberg v. Lorenz, 7 App. Div. 2d 968, 183 N.Y.S.2d 46 (1st Dcp't 1959). 
5 235 N.Y. 468, 139 N.E. 576 (1923). 
6 268 App. Div. 993, 51 N.Y.S.2d 645 (2d Dep't 1944). 
7 8 App. Div. 2d 637, 185 N.Y.S.2d 872 (2d Dcp't 1959). 
s 6 N.Y.2d 845, 160 N.E.2d 86, 188 N.Y.S.2d 551 (1959). 
9 7 App. Div. 2d 942, 181 N.Y.S.2d 800 (3d Dep't 1959). 
10 Ibid. 
11 7 App. Div. 2d 761, 180 N.Y.S.2d 99 (3d Dep't 1958). 
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resulting from the death of her intestate when he was administered 
plasma containing jaundice viruses by a hospital. The Court of Ap-
peals, in the much cited case of Perlmutter v. Beth David Hospital,12 
had previously held that no warranty action would lie against a 
hospital where deleterious blood was given a patient because the con-
tract between the institution and patient was one for services and not 
of sale. In the Krom case plaintiff argued that the hospital acted as 
agent for its patients when it purchased the blood from the processor. 
Noting that the Perlmutter case did not compel this conclusion, the 
court found none of the ordinary elements of agency present and 
affirmed an order dismissing the cause of action in warranty. It should 
be noted that the order appealed from had granted a motion made on 
the pleadings before proof had been offered. The court appears to have 
been influenced by the lack of any control which the deceased, who was 
unconscious during the treatment, could have exerted over the hos-
pital's decisions. Although the difficulties which the plaintiff would 
have in proving an agency relationship are obviously great, the intro-
duction of proof on this issue might have laid the basis for a warranty 
recovery. 
With the prospects of a reexamination of the privity question by 
the Court of Appeals in the Papp case, the cases of the past year are 
valuable as illustrating the various factual situations in which privity 
may be in issue. In Greenberg the retailer, who was the final instru-
mentality in the commercial distributive process, was sued by one who 
lacked privity only because she had not purchased the product herself, 
being instead a donee from the final purchaser. In Papp a retailer, 
being sued in warranty himself, attempted to bypass one party in the 
line of distribution and directly sue the manufacturer. Both the Burke 
and Krom cases involved consumers directly suing a processor al-
though they had obtained the product from a vendee of the processor. 
Even in these last two cases, however, there are differences worth 
noting. In Burke recourse against the retailer was possible under 
existing law. In this case, it should also be noted, the product was 
highly advertised-apparently being sold in a vending machine more 
prominently marked with the trademark of the product than with the 
name of the seller. This allows the conclusion that the plaintiff relied 
upon the bottler, not the retailer who was owner of the machine. In 
Krom a warranty action against the hospital was foreclosed, but, in 
contrast to the Burke case, no reliance upon the defendant seems 
possible. 
Both the commercial and legal differences in these four cases 
12 308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d 792 (1954). 
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demonstrate that careful consideration must be given by the Court of 
Appeals to any change in the privity requirement. The logical result of 
a decision simply stating that privity is no longer required in New York 
is that absolute liability for any product distributed would be imposed 
upon all vendors in favor of everyone no matter how remotely or 
tenuously they be connected with the original sale. If the court wishes 
to limit this broad rule, then lines must be clearly drawn as there is 
always a danger that the modification of a doctrine in one case will 
be extended to others. From the facts noted in the appellate division 
report, a reversal of the Papp case would necessarily involve a large 
step away from privity, one much further than has been proposed 
to the legislature in past years.13 
Nor should the court overlook the effect which the Personal 
Property Law14 has had in codifying the law of warranties. The con-
cept of the common law as ever growing and evolving as needs change 
is not only attractive but sound. A distinction should be drawn, how-
ever, between those cases where the legislature has never taken any 
part in making the law and those in which, by indicating a desire to 
codify rights and obligations through statutory enactment, the legisla-
ture has confined the judicial function to an interpretation of what 
they have written. An excellent example of the former is Woods v. 
Lancet, 15 a negligence action where the right of an infant to recover 
for injuries allegedly suffered while he was en. ventre sa mere was in 
issue. Here Judge Desmond said: 
Of course, rules of law on which men rely in their business dealings 
should not be changed in the middle of the game, but what bas that to 
do with bringing justice to a tort-feasor who surely bas no moral or 
other right to rely on a decision of the New York Court of Appeals? 
Negligence law is common law, and the common law bas been molded 
and changed and brought up-to-date in many another case, Our court 
bas said, long ago, that it had not only the right, but the duty to re-
examine a question where justice demands it .... 16 
This should be contrasted with the words of Judge Cardozo, who 
certainly cannot be said to have been unsympathetic to the view that 
13 The Law Revision Commission has recommended the amendment of the Personal 
Property Law by the addition of a new section, 97-a, which would extend express and 
implied warranties to any natural person who is an employee, member of the hou..<cliold 
or guest of the buyer, if it is reasonable to e.~ect that such persons may use, consume 
or be affected by the goods. N.Y. State Bar Ass'n, Circular No. 131 (Feb. 27, 1959). 
Such a proposal was before the legislature during 1959. S. Print 863; A. Print 1740. 
This is practically identical with Uniform Commercial Code § 2-318, except that the 
Code contains no reference to employees. 
14 N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law (1949). Sections 96 and 97 cover implied warranties. 
15 303 N.Y. 349, 102 N.E.2d 691 (1951). 
16 Id. at 354, 102 N.E.2d at 694. 
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the common law is elastic, in Manhattan Co. v. Morgan & Co.17 The 
outcome of this case depended upon whether an instrument was nego-
tiable under the Negotiable Instruments Law and he said: 
There is force in the argument that wider freedom of choice through 
the spontaneous flowerings of custom would work a social gain. One 
of the debit items to be charged against codifying statutes is the possi-
bility of interference with evolutionary growth. It is the ancient con-
flict between flexibility and certainty. So far as the Negotiable Instru-
ments Law is concerned, the remedy for the evil, if it be one, is an 
amendment of the statute . . . . Until such an amendment shall be 
adopted, the courts in their decisions must take for granted that the 
Legislature is content with the law as it is written.18 
Unfortunately, the privity question defies any attempt to dicho-
tomize the relationship between courts and the legislature in changing 
or modifying legal principles. The sections of the Personal Property 
Law covering warranties do speak of "buyers" and "sellers," but in no 
place do they specifically require privity. Hence it might be said that 
the legislators believe "that a change in a principle originated by judi-
cial decision can safely be left to and effected by decisional law to 
achieve the most salutary advances.mo 
The answer can be interposed, however, that all of commercial 
law, including that of sales and warranties, was created by the judicial 
process, but that this did not restrain the legislature from interfering 
with its decisional development. Indeed, by passage of the Uniform 
Sales Act and other commercial law statutes, it indicated a desire to 
take from the courts the function of developing law in this area. Nor is 
its omission of any specific reference to privity difficult to explain. At 
the time of the passage of the Uniform Sales Act there was no question 
but that privity was required in an action ex contractu, and a suit in 
warranty was without serious doubt considered to sound in contract. 
Perhaps a more pragmatic argument, and one which is more 
apropos of the privity question, is that the legislature, by virtue of its 
wide investigatory powers and abilities, is more suited to the task of 
refashioning the limits of liability imposed upon vendors of goods. 
As Judge Lewis expressed it in dissenting from the Woods decision: 
Better, I believe, that the right should be the product of legislative 
action taken after hearings at which the Legislature can be advised ... 
as to appropriate means-by time limitation for suits and otherwise-
11 242 N.Y.38, 150N.E. 594 (1926). 
18 Id. at 52, 150 N.E. at 599. 
19 Greenberg v. Lorenz, 12 Misc. 2d 8831 888, 178 N.Y.S.Zd 407, 412 (Sup. Ct., 
App. T., 1st Dep't 1958), modified, 7 App. Div. 2d 968, 183 N.Y.S.2d 46, leave to appeal 
granted, 8 App. Div. 2d 609, 185 N.Y.S.2d 740 (1st Dep't 1959). 
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Seldom does a question as important as that involved in the 
privity dispute reach the Court of Appeals. If a modification of the 
requirement is made, it will have far reaching effects on the business 
world, but, perhaps of even greater significance, will be the court's 
position on the proper sphere of activities of the courts vis-a-vis the 
legislature in the commercial law area. 
Vendor's Liability-Warranties-Representations .-Among the 
nonprivity warranty cases which deserve mention are three in which 
the court held that the vendor had neither expressly nor impliedly 
warranted the product against the alleged def ect.21 These cases, apply-
ing well settled law to their particular facts reemphasize the necessity 
of showing some representation, either expressly made or implied in 
law, in order to found a warranty action. 
Vendor's Liability-Warranties-Defect in Product.-In Zambino 
v. Colgate-Palmolive Co.,22 the court reversed a judgment in favor 
of a plaintiff allegedly injured by the application of a deodorant on the 
ground that no defect in the product had been proved. The apparent 
rationale of the decision leaves some doubt as to how cases of this type 
should be handled and classified. The facts showed that the plaintiff 
purchased the deodorant from the defendant, and that after using it 
she developed a contact dermatitis. A physician, in answer to a hypo-
thetical question, opined that the skin condition was caused by the 
deodorant, but no evidence was introduced to explain why the product 
was harmful. Two possibilities troubled the court: either that the 
plaintiff was suffering from an allergy, or that she induced the irritation 
herself in applying the product. 
If the plaintiff's disability was the result of an allergic reaction, a 
denial of recovery could be predicated on either of two theories: that 
the implied warranty of .fitness or merchantability is limited to the 
assertion that the product is fit or suitable only if used by a normal 
nonallergic consumer, or that there was failure to show any causation 
between the use of the product and the damage, the causative factor 
of the injury being the plaintiff's own allergic condition. 
The allergic reaction problem, one of the most interesting and 
20 Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 357, 102 N.E.2d 691, 695-96 (1951) (dissent). 
21 Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 7 App. Div. 2d 116, ISO 
N.Y.S.2d 471 (Sup. Ct., App. T., 1st Dep't 1958); Elm Coated Fabrics Co. v. Krasnov, 
16 :Misc. 2d 726, 185 N.Y.S.2d 145 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1959); and Vanity Fair Elec-
tronics Corp. v. Minitone, Inc., 11 Misc. 2d 861, 864, 178 N.Y.S.2d 263 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. 
Co. 1958). 
22 8 App. Div. 2d 304, 187 N.Y.S.2d 25 (3d Dep't 1959). 
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difficult existing today, has given courts of other jurisdictions consider-
able trouble,23 but, as yet, it has not been presented to the New York 
courts for any extensive consideration. Unfortunately because of the 
scarcity of facts shown at trial, the Zambino case offers little help in 
discerning the position of courts in this jurisdiction on this question. 
Vendor's Liability-Warranties-Plaintiff's Lack of Due Care.-
Connected, although perhaps somewhat subtly, with the allergy prob-
lem is the question of whether "contributory negligence" is a bar to 
recovery in warranty. This was considered in Natale v. Pepsi-Cola 
Co.24 Here the plaintiff was injured when a bottle allegedly exploded 
while he was attempting to open it on a metal hasp of a fence. The 
court, finding it beyond the limits of credulity that a bottle would 
successfully contain a beverage under the pressure with which it had 
been bottled but explode after some of the gas bad escaped, reversed 
a judgment in favor of the plaintiff. 
Remanding the case, the court discussed the proof offered to 
show the history of the bottle subsequent to its sale. Its holding, in 
connection with such evidence, that one who improperly uses a product 
after its purchase will be denied recovery in warranty where the injury 
is occasioned by his own misuse, can be explained in three ways, each 
of which was haphazardly noted by the court. First, it can be said 
that the warranty is confined to an implied representation that the 
product is merchantable only if properly used. As the court expressed 
it, "the defendant did not warrant the bottle to be accident proof.1120 
The reasoning may also be applied that the improper handling breaks 
the chain of causation between the alleged defect and the injury. In 
behalf of this theory the court said, "it is the breach of implied war-
ranty of merchantability which gives rise to the liability and the evi-
dence must affirmatjvely establish that it is causally related to the 
alleged injury."26 Finally, one of the most basic rules of damages, that 
a party bas a duty.to minimize and avoid injury where possible, even 
if it legally stems from another's wrongful act, can be applied. As the 
Natale case puts it, "a party cannot recover for a loss that he could 
have averted by the exercise of reasonable care."27 
Although it is difficult to perceive any variance in the result of the 
Natale case, it is possible that the acceptance or rejection of one of the 
23 Annot., 26 AL.R.2d 963 (1952). See also Condon, The Progress of Products 
Liability Law, 31 N.Y.S.B. Bull. 119 (1959). 
24 7 App. Div. 2d 282, 182 N.Y.S,2d 404 (1st Dep't 1959). Sec also Peragine v, 
Esposito, 17 Misc. 2d 621, 184 N.Y.S,2d 25 (Sup. Ct, App. T., 1st Dcp't 1959). 
25 7 App. Div. 2d at 284, 182 N.Y.S.2d at 407. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid. 
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theories will determine cases involving other facts.28 Whichever ra-
tionale is correct, the temptation to classify the defense as one of 
"contributory negligence" should be rejected. Not only is the language 
alien to the concept of warranties, but it also leads to misunderstanding 
and confusion. 
Statute of Frauds-Goods Manufactured Specially for Bteyer.-
One of the most important sales cases during the past year was E.G. 
Young Lumber Co. 'V. New York Bondstone Corp.2!! By an oral con-
tract the defendant-buyer had ordered window frames of a special 
size from the plaintiff who in turn had them manufactured by a third 
party. Upon their completion the defendant refused to accept the goods 
and relied upon the Statute of Frauds as a defense to this action for 
the purchase price. The principal issue was whether Section 85 of the 
New York Personal Property Law applied. This section provides 
that where "goods are manufactured by the seller especially for the 
·buyer" the contract is outside of the statute and hence need not be in 
writing. 
The court, practically reading the words "by the seller" out of 
the statute, held that section 85 controlled, and affirmed a judgment in 
favor of the plaintiff. Justice Hart, in noting that the case is in direct 
conflict with Eagle Paper Box Co. v. Gatti-M'Quade Co.,3° a decision 
of the first department, stated that his disagreement with the Eagle 
case was based upon the emphasis to be given particular words in the 
statute. The Eagle case had emphasized the words "by the seller," 
while he thought the greater emphasis should be placed on the words 
"for the buyer." However much one might be inclined to agree with 
the result in the Young case, either because of a general antagonism 
toward the Statute of Frauds or from a realization that businesswise 
it. makes little difference to the buyer whether the seller manufactured 
the goods himself or had another make them for him, the decision 
cannot be harmonized with a clear reading of the statute. The court's 
basis for decision gives no effect whatsoever to the words "by the 
seller" nor does it offer any explanation as to why they were inserted, 
if not to cover the factual situation here presented to the court. 
Criticism can be leveled at the decision not only because it illu-
28 An excellent example of this is found in McSpedon v. Kunz, 271 N.Y. 131, 2 
N.E.2d 513 (1936). If tbe court, as urged by tbe dissenting opinion, had held that tbcre 
was no warranty against tbe alleged defect, namely that pork was free from trichinae, 
an opposite decision would have resulted. 
20 15 Misc. 2d 985, 179 N.Y.S.2d 45 (Sup. Ct., App. T., 2d Dep't 1958), 33 SL John's 
~- Rev. 392 (1959). 
ao 99 Misc. 508, 164 N.Y. Supp. 201 (Sup. Ct., App. T., 1st Dep't 1917), afI'd mem., 
181 App. Div. 924, 167 N.Y. Supp.109? (1st Dep't 1917). 
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strates poor statutory construction, but also because it detracts from 
one of the purposes of uniform legislation. It is quite clear that the 
Uniform Sales Act intended to adopt the prior Massachusetts rule 
restricting the exemption from the Statute of Frauds to goods specially 
manufactured by the seller.31 The Eagle case, which followed this 
rule, is a sound decision and the Young case offers no reasons for a 
contrary holding. 
Terms of Sales Contract-Ojfer-Counteroffer.-Matter of Arbi-
tration Between W achusett Spinning Mills, Inc. and Bluebird Silk 
Mfg. Co.32 involved a dispute over whether a contract between the 
buyer and seller included an arbitration clause. After oral negotiations 
the buyer sent four purchase orders which included arbitration pro-
visions to the seller. The seller acknowledged these orders in due 
course and sent to the buyer a document entitled "Confirmation of 
Accepted Order" which referred specifically to the buyer's orders and 
contained a statement that "we have accepted your order subject to 
credit approval .... " This document made no reference to arbitration 
but did embody a provision that Massachusetts law would govern in 
the event of any disagreement. 
When a dispute arose, the buyer initiated arbitration proceedings 
and the seller moved for a stay on the ground that the final contractual 
agreement between the parties was to be determined solely by his 
"counteroffer" which contained no arbitration provisions. The court, 
distinguishing the case from the Court of Appeals decision in Albrecht 
Chemical Co. v. Anderson Trading Corp.,88 held that the form of the 
document sent by the seller in reply to the buyer's order indicated an 
intention, not to convey a counteroffer, but to accept the offer to buy 
under the terms of the original orders. 
A dissent was filed by Justice Valente in the Wachzesett case. 
From his analysis of the fact situation, he would hold that the 
seller's "Confirmation of Accepted Order" constituted the final contract 
agreed upon by the parties. Once reaching this conclusion, he finds 
lacking the clear language necessary to incorporate by reference the 
original orders in this contract. 
The case demonstrates the care which should be, but of ten is not, 
31 Professor Williston, draftsman of the act, approves the rule in the Eagle CllSC, 
"Under the Sales Act . . • goods, which are to be specially manufactured by a third 
person, and when manufactured sold to the buyer, [are] within the statute • , • ,11 1 Wil-
liston, Sales§ 55a (rev. ed. 1948). See also 2 Williston, Contracts§ 509A (rev. ed. 19J6). 
32 7 App. Div. 2d 382, 183 N.Y.S.2d 601 (1st Dep't), aff'd, 6 N.Y.2d 948, 161 N.E.2d 
222, 190 N.Y.S.2d 1011 (1959). For another case involving the construction of a sales 
contract and arbitration, see Matter of Stein Hall & Co., 13 Misc. 2d 547, 177 N.Y.S,2d 
603 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1958). 
33 298 N.Y. 437, 84 N.E.2d 625 (1949). 
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taken in the drafting of forms which are to form the basis of contrac-
tual relationships, and the necessity of clearly indicating the refusal 
to accept an offer under the terms presented when some of its provisions 
are unacceptable. II 
BILLS AND NOTES 
Legislation affecting the time during which notice of dishonor 
may be given by mail and several cases in which failure of considera-
tion was raised as a defense to promissory notes are the most im-
portant items during the past year. Also noted is a case involving the 
liability which attaches to the use of a credit card. 
Notice of Dishonor Sent by Mail.-Previously, where the parties 
resided in the same place and notice of dishonor of a negotiable instru-
ment was sent by mail, it had to be sent to the party sought to be held 
so as to reach him in the usual course on the day following dishonor?' 
This requirement has been changed by the legislature so that the 
notice is valid if "deposited in the post-office in time to go by mail the 
day following, or if there be no mail at a convenient hour on that day, 
by the next mail thereafter."35 The legislation extends the time allowed 
for mailing of dishonor, but, as has been noted elsewhere/10 not only 
fails to clarify previous ambiguities in this section, but also raises the 
question of the proper interpretation to be given the words "to go by 
mail." 
Promissory Notes-Failure of Consideratfrm,-Maker's Liability. 
-To be balanced against the commercial advances made possible by 
the concept of negotiability is the possibility which it affords the un-
scrupulous to shirk their responsibilities and pit two "innocent" parties 
against one another in a law suit. Several cases of this type reached 
the New York courts during the past year, all of them following a 
similar pattern. The dramatis personae included a contractor who 
accepted a note in payment for work yet to be performed, an innocent 
maker of the note and an equally innocent, or at least an allegedly 
blameless, financial institution. The plot has the contractor breaching 
his agreement sometime after the instrument has been sold to the 
bank or discountor and a subsequent suit by a transferee of the note 
against the maker. Failure of consideration is alleged as a defense and 
the holder counters with the claim that consideration is conclusively 
presumed as he is a holder in due course. 
34 N.Y. Negotiable Inst. Law § 174 (Supp. 1959). 
35 N.Y. Negotiable Inst. Law § 174, as amended, N.Y. Scss. Laws 1959, ch. 155, § 1. 
In regard to notice sent by mail, this section now reads substantially the same as § 175, 
which covers notice sent when parties reside in different places. 
36 23 Albany L. Rev. 473 (1959). 
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The New York courts have steered a straight course in handling 
these cases which seem to have become more prevalent since the end of 
World War II and the advent of the Home Improvement Loan.87 In 
two cases, Stratford Factors v. Liboria Corp.38 and Stratford Credit 
Corp. v. Pettrone,30 summary judgment for the plaintiff was held to 
be unwarranted when the defendant raised a triable issue as to 
whether plaintiff had knowledge of the breach prior to the date on 
which he purchased the notes. However, in two others, Franklin Nat'l 
Bank v. Kinsey40 and Dave Snyder Lumber Co. v. Karlson Associates, 
/nc.,41 it was held that a breach after the holder had bought the instru-
ment was no defense. 
The Franklin N at'l Bank case is of additional interest because of 
a novel defense raised by the maker. He admitted requesting a loan 
of $1,235, with knowledge that he would have to repay $27.65 
each month for five years, and signing a note which was blank as 
to the amount due. The principal sum of $1,659 (60 x $27.65), 
representing the amount borrowed plus interest, was inserted, appar-
ently by the payee, before the bank purchased the note. The question 
arose as to whether the payee had authority to fill in the blank. The 
defendant claimed that he never multiplied the monthly payments by 
the number of months and would not have agreed to repay a total 
amount of over $1,600. The court denied the defense on the grounds 
that the defendant-maker, by authorizing the insertion of the in-
stallments knowing the amount to be paid each month and the number 
of payments, had impliedly authorized the payee to insert the total 
amount. 
Two cases, Eaton v. Laurel Delicatessen Corp.42 and United 
States v. Brownlee,43 the former from the Second Circuit and the 
latter from the District Court for the Eastern District demonstrate 
the futility of attempting to insure that a maker obtains the bargained-
for consideration. In the Eaton case the plaintiff, who had purchased 
defendant's notes from the payee, obtained a written agreement from 
the defendant-maker warranting that the notes were a true obligation 
without any offset or counterclaim. In face of this warranty the de-
fendant claimed that a failure of consideration released him from 
87 See Savage, Commerical Law, 33 N.Y.UL. Rev. 506, 513, in 1957 Ann. Survey 
Am. L. 302, 309 (1958); and Savage, Commercial Law, 34 N.Y.UL. Rev. 1891 2091 in 
1958 Ann. Survey Am. L. 387, 407 (1959). 
38 6 App. Div. 2d 423, 178 N.Y.S.2d 703 (1st Dep't 1958). 
30 11 Misc. 2d 65, 177 N.Y.S.2d 994 (Monroe County Ct. 1958). 
40 17 Misc. 2d 742, 183 N.Y.S.2d 891 (Sup. Ct., Nassau Co. 1959), 
41 7 App. Div. 2d 925, 183 N.Y.S.2d 493 (2d Dep't 1959). 
42 5 N.Y.2d 1029, 158 N.E.2d 251, 185 N.Y.S.2d 551 (1959). 
43 168 F. Supp. 42 (E.DN.Y. 1958). 
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liability. The court correctly held that he was estopped from pleading 
the defense because of the express warranty to the contrary. 
The Brownlee case involved a Federal Housing Administration 
Home Improvement loan. In these transactions, the FHA requires the 
borrower to sign a FHA Title I Completion Certificate wherein it is 
certified, by the borrower, that "all articles and materials have been 
furnished and installed by the contractor and the work satisfactorily 
completed." 44 The importance of this statement is clearly indicated 
to the signor in bold type, and notices are also included on the certifi-
cate informing the borrower that it is his responsibility to assure satis-
factory compliance with the contract by the contractor and warning 
him of criminal penalties for making false statements thereon. 
In the Brownlee case the defendant, a maker of the note in ques-
tion, had signed the completion certificate although work had not 
commenced. After the loan had been granted, the note was negotiated 
by the contractor to a factor who in turn sold it to a bank. Subsequent 
to this last sale, the maker informed the factor of the contractor's 
default and his unwillingness to pay on the note. This was done prior 
to the date on which his first installment became due. Upon the 
maker's default, the United States Government reimbursed the final 
holder for his loss and here sued the maker. The court, admitting that 
"the position of the defendant is an appealing one,mc. pointed out that 
his true grievance was against the contractor and held that the "in-
exorable operation of the law merchant"46 required liability to be 
imposed on him as maker. 
It is difficult to sympathize with the makers of the notes in these 
two cases. An appealing argument can probably be made that, as bor-
rowers, they were coerced and obliged to follow the procedures de-
manded by those offering credit. But what more can be done, either 
by an individual, as in the Eaton case, or by the Government, as in the 
Brownlee case, to protect them? If they had elected, and had been able, 
to pay the contractor with cash from their own reserves prior to com-
pletion of the work, they would have no remedy except against the 
contractor. In effect, they are doing just that here, except that instead 
of obtaining the cash from their own resources, they are inducing a 
third party, the financial institution, to pay it for them. 
The only question, as is indicated by the decisions of the past 
year, is whether the holder of the note was a bona fide purchaser of 
it in accordance with the requisites established by the Negotiable In-
44 24 C.F.R. § 202.S(e) (1959). 
45 United States v. Brownlee, 168 F. Supp. 42, 45 (E.D.N.Y. 1958). 
46 Ibid. 
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struments Law,47 although his relationship with the contractor bears 
scrutiny in determining whether he has met those requirements. 
Credit Cards-Liability of Holder.-During the past few years 
the credit card has been firmly established as a means of payment. 
With its entry into the commercial world, it is certain to bring new 
legal problems requiring judicial determination, but as yet few cases48 
have been decided which furnish information about the legal obliga-
tions and liabilities attaching to the various parties involved in its use. 
During the past year one case, Franklin Nat'l Bank v. Kass,49 
involved a dispute over a credit plan. The scheme here under consider-
ation initially involved three parties: a credit club, an employer, and his 
employee. The employer was designated as a "company member" of 
the club and it was contemplated that he would have furnished to his 
employees credit cards enabling them to charge purchases. Billing 
would be to the "club member" who would reimburse the club for 
charges incurred by the employee. 
The billing procedure operated thus: when the employee made 
a purchase he would present his card to the vendor and sign a charge 
slip. Thereafter the supplier of the goods would prepare a "Club 
Draft" which he signed and sent to the club for payment. Apparently 
the club would then pay the supplier. The "draft" was then "nego-
tiated" by the club to a bank who in turn would demand payment 
from the club member. 
In the Franklin N at'l Bank case the company member had become 
insolvent prior to paying the bank and the bank demanded payment 
from an individual employee who had incurred the charges. The com-
plaint was based upon the theory that these "club drafts" were bills of 
exchange within the meaning of the New York Negotiable Instruments 
Law, and that they had been accepted prior to being drawn. The 
allegation of acceptance was based upon a rule of the club to which 
assent had been given by the defendant when he signed the card with 
knowledge, constructive if not actual, of its existence. The club rule 
in question stated that "each of the card holders agrees to pay the 
charges incurred by him, and they agree to accept all drafts drawn on 
them for charges inccured . . . ."60 The court, holding this agreement 
to be the equivalent of an acceptance, found the defendant liable. 
It is difficult to understand why the court, or the plaintiff for that 
47 N.Y. Negotiable Inst. Law § 91 (1943). 
48 Annot., 158 A.L.R. 762 (1945). See Claflin, The Credit Card-A New Instrument, 
33 Conn. B.J. 1 (1959). For a criminal case involving credit cards decided during tho 
past year, see United States v. Golden, 166 F. Supp. 799 (S.DN.Y. 1958). 
49 184 N.Y.S.2d 783 (Sup. Ct., Nassau Co. 1959). 
50 Id. at 784-85. 
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matter, found it necessary to rely upon the tenuous ground that there 
was a collateral acceptance in this case. Some justification for the 
holding can be found in prior New York cases/1 even though the draft 
held to be accepted was never identified in the collateral agreement. 
However, this is stretching the law on this point.';2 A more satisfactory 
way of finding liability would have been to hold the card bearer liable 
on his simple promise to pay which he made in the club regulation 
previously cited. 
III 
SECURED TRANSACTIONS 
There is little of significance to report in the field of secured 
transactions. One case, which touched the law surrounding security 
devices only tangentially, is discussed because of its importance in this 
field. The legislature continued to modify recent legislation governing 
installment selling,53 the most important act being one which extended 
the scope of the Retail Instalment Sales ActM to dance studios, health 
clubs, reducing salons, and other enterprises involving long-term 
services to customers.55 
Conditional Sales-Third Party Promise to Assume Obligation-
Sta.tttte of Frauds.-In New York, by statute,no an oral promise to pay 
the debt of another is void. This rule is subject to an exception where 
the promisor would be independently liable irrespective of the liability 
of the principal debtor.57 Whether such an independent liability existed 
was considered during the past year in Biener Contracting Corp. v. 
Elberon Restaurant Corp.58 Defendant Wishnetzky held a chattel 
mortgage on :fixtures in the Elberon Restaurant. When the restaurant 
became :financially unstable he said to the plaintiff, who was the condi-
tional vendor of other :fixtures: 
Do me a favor. Don't take that action, [legal action on the con-
ditional sales agreement] . . . I have a lot of money invested in this 
place. I am going to . . . foreclose the mortgage, and I will take over 
51 Merchants' Bank of Canada v. Griswold, 72 N.Y. 472 (1878). Cf. Ruiz v. 
Renauld, 100 N.Y. 256, 3 N.E. 182 (1885); Ulster County Bank v. McFarlan, 3 Denio 
553 (N.Y. 1846). 
52 Britton, Bills and Notes §§ 172-78 (1943). 
53 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1959, chs. 705, 755. 
64 N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law art. 10 (Supp. 1959). For an excellent article on this type 
of legislation, see Maleson, Consumer Credit Regulation, 23 Albany L. Rev. 297 (1959). 
55 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1959, ch. 705. 
li6 N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law§ 31(2) (1949). 
57 White v. Rientoul, 108 N.Y. 222, 15 N.E. 318 (1888). 
58 7 App. Div. 2d 391, 183 N.Y.S.2d 756 (1st Dep't 1959), 28 Fordham L. Rev. 384 
(1959). See also Calamari, The Suretyship Statute of Frauds, 27 Fordham L. Rev. 332 
(1958), and Conway, Subsequent Oral Promise to Perform Another's Duty and the 
New York Statute of Frauds, 22 Fordham L. Rev. 119 (1953). 
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the place, the obligations. I am going to pay you. I want to run the 
place myself . . . and I will pay you each and every note in full.Go 
Wishnetzky did in fact take over the restaurant and pay some of 
the notes. Eventually, however, the business closed and the plaintiff 
sued to collect on the remaining notes. The court held the defendant's 
promise constituted an independent obligation given in order to secure 
a business advantage and enforceable though oral. 
Except for the proposition that the mere unconditional form of a 
promise to pay another's debt will not take it outside of the statute,00 
little delineation of the New York rule has been made by the courts.01 
In holding that the above-quoted promise was sufficient to allow the 
plaintiff to avoid the Statute of Frauds, the Biener case does little to 
clarify the rule. The more important facts in the case appear to be 
those occuring subsequent to the oral agreement, viz., that the promisee 
looked to the promisor for payment as the new primary party and that 
the latter did, in fact, make some payments. It would have been 
proper for the court to find that these actions of the parties were of 
importance in determining defendant's liability.02 Indeed, it seems 
impossible that the decision could have been reached by any other 
means. 
IV 
BANKING LAW 
Neither the legislation nor the cases of the past year warrant 
detailed discussion herein. As usual, numerous bills of a technical 
nature were passed by the legislature. These are carefully collected 
elsewhere. 63 The most important proposals were the perennial attempts 
to sanction bank holding companies and to relax restrictions on branch 
banking, but these were once again defeated.o-i 
Of the four cases which reached appellate tribunals, two were 
brought by customers claiming that the financial institution made an 
unauthorized payment from their accounts, 65 one by a bank against 
\ 
59 Biener Contracting Corp. v. Elberon Restaurant Corp., 7 App. Div. 2d 391, 3911 
183 N.Y.S.2d 756, 757 (1st Dep't 1959). 
60 Richardson Press v. Albright, 224 N.Y. 4971 121 N.E. 362 (1918). 
61 28 Fordham L. Rev. 384, 386 (1959). 
62 Cf. Richardson Press v. Albright, 224 N.Y. at 502, 121 N.E. at 364. 
63 N.Y. State Banking Dep't, Legislative Summary (1959). 
64 See Harfield, Legal Restraints On Expanding Banking Facilities, Competition 
and the Public Interest, 14 Bus. Law. 1016 (1959), and N.Y. Times, Mar. 27, 19591 
p. 32, col. 2. 
65 Romero v. Sjoberg, 5 N.Y.2d 518, 158 N.E.2d 828, 186 N.Y.S.2d 246 (1959)'; 
Karp v. Karp, 6 App. Div. 2d 1055, 179 N.Y.S.2d 681 (2d Dep't 1958) 1 nff'd, 5 N.Y.2il 
933, 156 N.E.2d 818, 183 N.Y.S.2d 296 (1959). 
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a depositor who cashed a check on a closed account00 and one by a 
plaintiff charging that the bank had failed to give timely notice of 
protest.67 
66 Manufacturers Trust Co. v. Diamond, 17 llrfisc. 2d 909, 186 N.Y.S.2d 917 (Sup. 
Ct., App. T., 1st Dep't 1959). 
6'l' Hoffower v. Pennsylvania Exch. Bank, 8 App. Div. 2d 585, 183 N.Y .S.2d 620 
(4th Dep't 1959). 
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